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The role of Rational Beliefs in PTS 
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	
 Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) assumes that rational beliefs act 
as cognitive protective factors against the development of psychopathology however little 
empirical evidence exists regarding the nature of the possible protective effects offer by 
rational beliefs.  The current study investigates whether rational beliefs serve to 
moderate the impact of irrational beliefs on posttraumatic stress symptomology 
(PTS).  Three hundred and thirteen (N = 313) active law enforcement, military, and 
related emergency service personnel took part in the current study. Sequential moderated 
multiple regression analysis was employed to investigate (i) the direct impact of irrational 
beliefs on PTS, (ii) the direct impact of rational beliefs on PTS, (iii) the moderating effects of 
rational beliefs in the relationship between irrational beliefs and PTS.  The irrational 
beliefs predicted by REBT theory emerged as critical predictors of PTS symptomology, in 
particular Depreciation beliefs. Rational beliefs (Preferences, and Acceptance beliefs) had a 
direct, negative impact on levels of PTS, and Acceptance beliefs moderated the impact of 
Catastrophizing beliefs on PTS.  Irrational beliefs are important cognitive 
vulnerability factors in symptoms of PTS, while rational beliefs (Acceptance) appear to have 
a protective role in the emergence of PTS symptoms both directly and by moderating the 
impact of Catastrophizing beliefs.   
 
Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), Posttraumatic Stress 
Symptomology (PTS), Rational Beliefs, Irrational Beliefs, Moderation 
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
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) is the original form of Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy (CBT) (see Ellis, 1958, 1962). The general theory of REBT is built upon Ellis’ 
(1962, 1994) ‘ABC’ model. This model presents the core theoretical principle of CBT that 
beliefs (B) mediate the relationship between activating events in our internal of external 
environments (A) and a range of cognitive6emotional6behavioural6physiological 
consequences (C) that can be experienced. REBT theory is distinguished from other CBT 
models in that it hypothesises that evaluative/appraisal beliefs represent the most proximate 
cognitive antecedents of cognitive6emotional6behavioural6physiological responses (Hyland & 
Boduszek, 2012). 
 Contemporary REBT theory discusses two general belief groups, namely irrational 
beliefs, and rational beliefs (David, Lynn, Ellis, 2010). Within both belief groups, REBT 
theory discusses four types of belief processes. The primary irrational belief process is stated 
to be Demandingness beliefs. These beliefs are rigid, absolutistic insistences for how things 
“must be”, “ought to be”, “should be”, “have to be” etc. (e.g. “I must give a good 
presentation at work.”). The secondary irrational belief processes include; Catastrophizing 
beliefs which refer to beliefs that an individual holds where unpleasant events are evaluated 
in the most extremely negative fashion possible (e.g. “If I don’t give a good presentation, it 
will be a complete disaster.”); Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs, which are beliefs that 
reflect a person’s evaluation that they are completely incapable of withstanding, tolerating, or 
being capable of experiencing any kind of happiness should they not get what they demand 
they must get, or get what they demand they must not get (e.g. “I couldn’t bare it if I were to 
give a poor presentation.”); and Depreciation beliefs in which a person makes 
overgeneralized and all encompassing negative conclusions about themselves, others, or the 
world when they do not live up to their self6imposed demands (e.g. “If I give a bad 
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presentation, I would be a complete failure.”). REBT theory therefore predicts that 
Demandingness beliefs, as the primary irrational belief process, impacts upon various forms 
of emotional distress and psychopathology through the secondary irrational belief processes 
of Catastrophizing beliefs, Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs, and/or Depreciation beliefs. 
Various studies have been undertaken to investigate the organisation and interrelations 
between the irrational beliefs and there is substantial evidence supporting the predictions of 
REBT theory (David, Schnur, & Belloiu, 2002; David, Ghinea, Macavei, & Kallay, 2005; 
DiLorenzo, David, & Montgomery, 2007, 2011; Moldovan, 2009).  
 Each irrational belief processes is hypothesised to share an alternative rational belief. 
The rational alternative to Demandingness beliefs are Preference beliefs. Preference beliefs 
reflect flexible beliefs about how a person wants, desires, or prefers something to be (e.g. “I’d 
like to make a good presentation at work but obviously there is no reason why I have to give 
a good presentation just because I want to.”). The secondary rational belief processes include; 
Non6Catastrophizing beliefs whereby an individual evaluates negative events in realistic 
terms (e.g. “Giving a bad presentation would be bad, but it wouldn’t be the end of the 
world.”); High Frustration Tolerance beliefs whereby a person believes that they can tolerate 
and withstand difficulties or discomforts in life (e.g. “It would be very unpleasant to give a 
poor presentation but I could stand the unpleasantness.”); and Acceptance beliefs whereby an 
individual does not make a global evaluation of one’s own or another’s worth on the basis of 
a single behaviour, rather the person legitimately rates one’s behaviour but not their whole 
self (e.g. “I gave a very poor presentation on this occasion, but I can accept myself as a 
fallible human being that sometimes performs poorly at certain things.”). 
 There is a large body of empirical evidence which demonstrates that irrational beliefs 
are critical cognitive variables in the emergence of various forms of psychopathology 
including  mood disorders (Macavei, 2005; Muran, Kassinove, Ross, & Muran, 1989; Nelson, 
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1977; Prud’homme & Barron, 1992; McDermutt, Haaga, & Bilek, 1997; Blatt, 1995), major 
depressive disorder (Szentagotai, David, Lupu, & Cosman, 2008), various anxiety disorders 
(Nieuwenhuijsen, Verbeek, Boer, Blonk, & van Dijk, 2010; Lupu & Iftene, 2009; DiLorenzo, 
et al., 2007; Montgomery, David, DiLorenzo, & Schnur, 2007; Lorcher, 2003), anger 
disorders (Jones & Towers, 2004; Martin & Dahlen, 2004; Silverman & DiGiuseppe, 2001; 
Bernard, 1998), symptoms of various general psychiatric disorders (Alden, Safran, & 
Weideman, 1978), lack of assertiveness (Alden et al., 1978), type A coronary prone behavior 
pattern (Smith & Brehm, 1981), trait anger, trait depression, and trait anxiety (Bernard, 
1998), and state anger, state guilt, and state anxiety (David et al., 2002).  
 While a great deal of research has examined the role of irrational beliefs as cognitive 
vulnerability factors in the emergence and maintenance of psychopathology, comparatively 
little is known about the role of rational beliefs. There is evidence that activation of rational 
beliefs during activating events gives rise to non6distorted automatic thoughts, functional and 
healthy emotional responses, and various adaptive behavioural and physiological responses 
(see David et al., 2010 for a full review). This seems to suggest that rational beliefs may serve 
as cognitive protective factors against the development of psychological distress. 
Additionally, rational beliefs are also theorised not to represent bipolar manifestations of their 
irrational counterparts but rather they are believed to represent a unique and distinct cognitive 
construct. While there has been little effort to directly investigate the nature of the 
relationship between rational and irrational beliefs, what evidence does exist provides 
tentative support for the hypothesis that rational and irrational beliefs are not bipolar 
cognitive constructs. Bernard (1998) found a moderate, negative statistically significant 
correlation of 60.44 between rational beliefs and irrational beliefs in a study of the latent 
structure of the General Attitudes and Belief Scale. In another study of the underlying factor 
structure of the Romanian version of the Attitudes and Belief Scale62 (Macavei, 2002), 
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rational beliefs and irrational beliefs were found to possess a weak, negative, statistically 
significant correlation of 60.32 (Fulop, 2007). Additionally, DiLorenzo et al. (2011) found 
similar levels of association between the various rational and irrational beliefs under 
investigation (correlations ranged from 60.29 to 60.34). These findings suggest that although a 
person may report high levels of irrational beliefs, this does not necessarily indicate low 
levels of rational beliefs. 
 The aim of the current study is to add to the existing REBT literature with regards to 
possible protective role of rational beliefs in the emergence of psychopathology in a unique 
and novel way by investigating whether or not the presence of rational beliefs can serve to 
moderate the impact of the various irrational belief processes on levels of posttraumatic stress 
symptomology (PTS). This investigation will therefore serve to further elucidate the role 
played by both rational and irrational beliefs in psychopathology by investigating for the first 
time the direct impact of the various irrational beliefs on levels of PTS, as well as to assess 
whether the presence of rational beliefs can serve to moderate the impact of irrational beliefs 
on symptoms of PTS. The current study will therefore provide additional evidence regarding 
the nature of the relationship between rational and irrational beliefs. 
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

The sample for the current study consisted of three hundred and thirteen participants (N = 
313). The sample consisted of an international group of soldiers (n = 81, 25.9%), police 
officers (n = 183, 58.5%), and associated emergency service personnel (n = 49, 15.7%) 
recruited from active duty while serving in the Republic of Ireland and the Republic of 
Kosovo over a twelve month period (June 2011 – June 2012). All participants in the current 
study had been exposed to at least one major traumatic experience. The sample consisted of 
212 males (67.7%) and 101 females (32.3%). The participants ranged in age from 23 to 65 
with a mean age of the total sample of 38.18 years (SD = 8.70). Participants were informed of 
the nature of the study being under taken either by a member of the research team or an 
assigned liaison for a particular organisation, and each participant’s involvement in the 
research project was voluntary. No obligations were placed upon potential respondents nor 
were any inducements employed to recruit the sample. Each participant was assured about 
confidentiality and those who chose to take part in the research project had the option of 
completing either an anonymous self6administered paper6and6pencil version of the 
questionnaire or an electronic version which was delivered and returned via email. The 
majority of respondents chose the paper6and6pencil option (63.26%, n = 198). 

	

	

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
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		 
is a 496item self6report measure of the severity of posttraumatic stress symptomology related 
to a particular traumatic event. The PDS assess all aspect of a PTSD diagnosis from Criteria 
A to F as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). The PDS measures the nature of the traumatic experience, the 
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duration of the experienced symptoms, the impact of the experienced symptoms on daily 
functioning, and the severity of the symptoms. Seventeen items measure the 17 identified 
symptoms of PTS along a four6point Likert scale. Respondents rate the severity of each 
symptom ranging from a score of 0 ("not at all or only one time") to 3 ("5 or more times a 
week / almost always"). This produces a total range of scores from 0 to 51 with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of posttraumatic stress symptomology. The PDS possess strong 
psychometric properties with Griffin, Uhlmansiek, Resick, and Mechanic (2004) 
demonstrating that it shares a strong correlation with the Clinician6Administered PTS scale 
(Blake et al., 1995). 
!""	#
$%	&!$
$'&
(!%)!'( is a 246item self6
report measure of rational and irrational beliefs, as defined by current REBT theory (David et 
al., 2010). The AV6ABS2 measures all four irrational belief processes (Demandingness, 
Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Depreciation) and their corresponding four 
rational belief processes (Preferences, Non6Catastrophizing, High Frustration Tolerance, and 
Acceptance). Each subscale is measured via three items. The AV6ABS2 produces a total 
composite score for both rational and irrational beliefs as well as producing total scores on 
each of the individual rational and irrational belief processes. Item are scored along a five6
point Likert scale from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”), with higher scores in 
each case indicating higher levels of the respective variable. Possible scores for each subscale 
range from 3615 with higher scores indicative of higher levels of each belief process. The 
AV6ABS2 exhibited satisfactory internal consistency with all subscales recording a 
Cronbach’s Alpha level above .70 (see Table 1). 
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
	*#
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
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
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 1 indicate that the current sample of 313 police 
officers, military personnel, and related emergency service workers demonstrated relatively 
low levels of PTS, on average.  In terms of the irrational belief processes, moderate levels of 
Demandingness beliefs, Catastrophizing beliefs, and Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs were 
reported while low6to6moderate levels of Depreciation beliefs were reported. In terms of the 
rational belief processes, moderate levels of each of the four rational belief processes 
(Preferences, Non6Catastrophizing, High Frustration Tolerance, and Acceptance) were 
indicated.  
+,-.!'/-0-.-
Table 1 also reports the correlations amongst the predictor variables (Demandingness, 
Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, Depreciations Preferences, Non6
Catastrophizing, High Frustration Tolerance, and Acceptance) included in the study.  Of the 
correlations between the predictor variables that were statistically significant, these 
correlations generally ranged from weak to moderate indicating multicollinearity was 
unlikely to be a problem (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, one correlation was 
strong and reached a level that indicated a possible violation of multicollinearity. This 
correlation was between Depreciation and Acceptance beliefs (r = .90, p < .001), however 
investigation of the Tolerance and VIF statistics demonstrated that although high, these levels 
did not exceed an acceptable level. On the basis of these VIF and Tolerance values, and the 
fact that these beliefs are the rational and irrational counterparts of each other, it was decided 
to retain these two variables rather than collapse them into a single variable.  
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Furthermore all predictor variables were significantly correlated with PTS with the 
exception of Preference beliefs. These correlations with the dependent variable (PTS) ranged 
from weak to strong, ranging from r = 6.28, p < .001 between Non6Catastrophizing and PTS 
to r = 6.75, p < .001 between Acceptance beliefs and PTS. These results indicate that the data 
was suitably correlated with the dependent variable for examination through multiple linear 
regression to be reliably undertaken. 
1
$	
$*		 
A sequential moderated multiple regression analysis as the recommended method for testing 
interaction effects (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) was applied in order to investigate the predictive 
relationship between the irrational belief processes (Demandingness, Catastrophizing, Low 
Frustration Tolerance, and Depreciations) and PTS while examining for the moderating role 
of each of the four rational belief processes (Preferences, Non6Catastrophizing, High 
Frustration Tolerance, and Acceptance).  Four separate models were thus specified and 
empirically tested with all predictor and moderator variables being centred as suggested by 
Aiken and West (1991). 
The first model considered the moderating role of Preference beliefs. In the first step 
of sequential moderated multiple regression, five predictors were entered: Demandingness 
beliefs, Catastrophizing beliefs, Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs, Depreciation beliefs, and 
Preference beliefs. This model was statistically significant F (5, 298) = 116.82; p < .001 and 
explained 66.2% of variance in levels of PTS (see Table 2). All variables with the exception 
of Demandingness beliefs were statistically significant predictors of levels of PTS however 
the strongest predictor of PTS was Depreciation beliefs (β = .40 p < .001). The final step 
consisted of entering the interaction terms coding interactions between Preference beliefs and 
all four irrational belief processes. After the entry of the interaction effects the model as a 
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whole explained 66.5% of variance in intentions F (9, 294) = 64.80; p < .001. The addition of 
the interaction effects at Step 2 only accounted for an additional 0.3% of variance in levels of 
PTS and this changes was not statistically significant (R2 Change = .003; F (4, 294) = .582; p 
= .676). The results at this step indicated that Demandingness beliefs (β = .11, p = .043), 
Catastrophizing beliefs (β = .18, p = .001), Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs (β = .27, p < 
.001), and Depreciation beliefs (β = .41, p < .001) were all significant predictors of levels of 
PTS. Additionally, no empirical evidence was found that Preference beliefs directly impacts 
levels of PTS or moderates the impact of any of the irrational beliefs on PTS. 
+,-.!'/-(0-.-
 
The second model considered the moderating role of Non6Catastrophizing beliefs. In the first 
step of sequential moderated multiple regression, five predictors were entered: 
Demandingness beliefs, Catastrophizing beliefs, Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs, 
Depreciation beliefs, and Non6Catastrophizing beliefs. This model was statistically 
significant F (5, 298) = 114.61; p < .001 and explained 65.8% of variance in levels of PTS 
(see Table 3). All predictor variables at this step with the exception of Non6Catastrophizing 
beliefs were statistically significant predictors of levels of PTS with Depreciation beliefs 
identified as the strongest predictor of PTS (β = .40, p < .001). The final step consisted of 
entering the interaction terms coding interactions between Non6Catastrophizing beliefs and 
all four irrational belief processes. After the entry of the interaction effects the model as a 
whole explained 65.9% of variance in intentions F (9, 294) = 63.21; p < .001. The addition of 
the interaction effects at Step 2 only accounted for an additional 0.1% of variance in levels of 
PTS and this change was unsurprisingly not statistically significant (R2 Change = .001; F (4, 
294) = .299; p = .879). These results indicated that Demandingness beliefs (β = .11, p = .034), 
Catastrophizing beliefs (β = .18, p = .001), Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs (β = .27, p < 
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.001), and Depreciation beliefs (β = .40, p < .001) were all significant predictors of levels of 
PTS. Additionally, no empirical evidence was found that Non6Catastrophizing beliefs directly 
impact levels of PTS or moderates the impact of the various irrational belief groups on levels 
of PTS. 
+,-.!'/-20-.-
 
The third model considered the moderating role of High Frustration Tolerance beliefs. In the 
first step of sequential moderated multiple regression, five predictors were entered: 
Demandingness beliefs, Catastrophizing beliefs, Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs, 
Depreciation beliefs, and High Frustration Tolerance beliefs. This model was statistically 
significant F (5, 299) = 125.12; p < .001 and explained 67.7% of variance in levels of PTS 
(see Table 4). All predictor variables with the exception of Demandingness beliefs were 
statistically significant predictors of levels of PTS and the strongest predictor of PTS at this 
step was again Depreciation beliefs (β = .35, p < .001). The final step consisted of entering 
the interaction terms coding interactions between High Frustration Tolerance beliefs and all 
four irrational belief processes. After the entry of the interaction effects the model as a whole 
explained 69.3% of variance in intentions F (9, 295) = 65.84; p < .001. The addition of the 
interaction effects at Step 2 accounted for an additional 1.7% of variance in levels of PTS and 
this change in explained variance was statistically significant (R2 Change = .017; F (4, 295) = 
3.98; p = .004). These results indicated that Demandingness beliefs (β = .13, p = .014), 
Catastrophizing beliefs (β = .18, p < .001), Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs (β = .24, p < 
.001), Depreciation beliefs (β = .30, p < .001), and High Frustration Tolerance beliefs (β = 6
.13, p = .002) were all significant predictors of levels of PTS. Additionally, no empirical 
evidence was found that High Frustration Tolerance beliefs serve to moderate the impact of 
the various irrational belief groups on levels of PTS. 
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The fourth model considered the moderating role of Acceptance beliefs. In the first step of 
sequential moderated multiple regression, five predictors were entered: Demandingness 
beliefs, Catastrophizing beliefs, Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs, Depreciation beliefs, and 
Acceptance beliefs. This model was statistically significant F (5, 298) = 121.89; p < .001 and 
explained 67.2% of variance in levels of PTS (see Table 5). All variables with the exception 
of Demandingness beliefs were statistically significant predictors of levels of PTS and the 
strongest predictor of PTS was Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs (β = .24, p < .001). The 
final step consisted of entering the interaction terms coding interactions between Acceptance 
beliefs and all four irrational belief processes. After the entry of the interaction effects the 
model as a whole explained 68.9% of variance in intentions F (9, 294) = 72.38; p < .001. The 
addition of the interaction effects at Step 2 accounted for an additional 1.7% of variance in 
levels of PTS and this additional variance explained was statistically significant (R2 Change = 
.017; F (4, 294) = 4.12; p = .003). These results indicated that Demandingness beliefs (β = 
.13, p = .029), Catastrophizing beliefs (β = .20, p < .001), Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs 
(β = .25, p < .001), and Acceptance beliefs (β = 6.23, p = .006) were all significant predictors 
of levels of PTS. 
One statistically significant moderating effect was observed for the interaction 
between Catastrophizing beliefs and Acceptance beliefs (β = 6.13, p = .031) indicating that 
the impact of Catastrophizing beliefs on levels of PTS depends upon the levels of Acceptance 
beliefs. Simple slopes for the relationship between Acceptance beliefs and PTS were 
investigated for low (61 SD below the mean), medium (mean), and high (+1 SD above the 
mean) levels of Acceptance beliefs (see Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan, 
1990). Each of the simple slope tests indicated a positive association between Catastrophizing 
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beliefs and PTS, however Catastrophizing beliefs were most weakly associated with levels of 
PTS when levels of Acceptance beliefs were high (see Figure 1).  
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
The current study was carried out in order to provide additional empirical evidence to the 
REBT literature with regards to the hypothesised protective role of rational beliefs in the 
development of psychopathology by conducting the first empirical investigation of the 
moderating role of rational beliefs in the relationship between irrational beliefs and 
psychopathology.  This study also sought to assess, for the first time, the direct impact of the 
various irrational and rational beliefs on levels of PTS, as well as to further investigate 
whether rational and irrational beliefs are best conceptualised as bipolar constructs or whether 
they represent qualitatively distinct cognitive constructs. 
 As can be seen in Table 1, findings of the current study provide equivocal indications 
regarding the relationship of irrational beliefs to rational beliefs. No statistically significant 
associations were observed between the primary rational and irrational belief processes 
(Preference and Demandingness beliefs), while a weak, negative association was identified 
between Non6Catastrophizing and Catastrophizing beliefs, and a weak6to6moderate negative 
association was discovered between High Frustration Tolerance and Low Frustration 
Tolerance beliefs. These results strongly suggest that these three rational and irrational belief 
processes are not bi6polar constructs. Contrastingly, there was a strong, negative association 
identified between Acceptance and Depreciation beliefs, indicating that these variables are 
bipolar constructs of each other. Given that none of the other rational and irrational belief 
process approached this level of association, it is possible that the strong (negative) 
relationship observed between Acceptance and Depreciation beliefs is a consequence of an 
inability of the AV6ABS2 to properly discriminate between these constructs. Additional 
research utilizing generalised, and ideally, disorder6specific measures of rational and 
irrational beliefs will be required to gain better insight into whether or not these particular 
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belief processes are bipolar constructs. Overall, current results support previous indications 
(Bernard, 1998) that rational and irrational beliefs represent separate cognitive constructs. 
 In order to investigate the unique direct effects of rational and irrational beliefs on 
PTS, and the interaction effects of the four rational belief processes (Preferences, Non6
Catastrophizing, High Frustration Tolerance, and Acceptance beliefs), four distinct models 
were estimated and tested.  In the first model we sought to assess the direct impact of each of 
the irrational belief processes (Demandingness, Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, 
and Depreciations) along with Preference beliefs. The results indicated that Preferences had a 
very weak, negative direct impact on levels of PTS, suggesting that those who have higher 
levels of Preference beliefs tend to experience lower levels of PTS. Additionally, 
Catastrophizing, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Depreciation beliefs all positively 
influenced levels of PTS, with Depreciation beliefs being the strongest predictor of PTS. 
Catastrophizing and Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs have been predicted to be important 
variables in the emergence of anxiety disorders, in general, (see David, 2003) and the present 
results provide support for this prediction of REBT theory.  
 It is interesting to note that Depreciation beliefs, which are normally more commonly 
observed as key cognitive variables in the development of mood disorders, were the strongest 
predictor of PTS among the current sample. Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
depression have been well established to share a high degree of comorbidity (Kessler, 
Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995; Zlotnick, Johnson, Kohn, Vicente, Rioseco, & 
Saldiva, 2006) and this may well account for the discovery that self6depreciatory beliefs were 
consistently identified as the strongest predictor of PTS. Also of interest is that 
Demandingness beliefs were not a statistically significant predictor of levels of PTS. REBT 
theory predicts that Demandingness beliefs should exert their influence on psychological 
distress through the secondary irrational belief processes, thus the observation of no direct 
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influence of Demandingness beliefs on PTS is understandable in light of theoretical 
predictions. Within this model, Preference beliefs did not serve to moderate the relationship 
of any of the four irrational beliefs with levels of PTS.  
 A very similar pattern of results emerged from the next two models which assessed 
the direct and moderating effects of Non6Catastrophizing, and High Frustration Tolerance 
beliefs, respectively. Again we observed that Depreciation beliefs were the strongest 
predictor of PTS, and in both cases neither rational belief process had a direct impact on 
levels of PTS, nor did either belief process exhibit a moderating effect for any of the 
irrational beliefs on PTS.  
 The final model considered the direct and moderating role of Acceptance beliefs. In 
this case, Acceptance beliefs demonstrated a weak but statistically significant direct effect on 
levels of PTS, suggesting that higher levels of Acceptance beliefs are associated with lower 
levels of PTS. Moreover, Acceptance beliefs were found to moderate the impact of 
Catastrophizing beliefs on levels of PTS. These results indicate that Acceptance beliefs serve 
as important cognitive protective factors in the emergence of PTS, not only directly as would 
be expected, but also by modulating in a positive direction the impact that Catastrophizing 
beliefs can have on levels of PTS. 
 These results, considered in their totality, provide strong empirical support for REBT 
theory within the context of a psychiatric disorder not yet examined by the REBT 
community. Our results demonstrated that the irrational beliefs hypothesised as crucial in the 
emergence and maintenance of psychopathology by REBT theory, are indeed very important 
predictors of PTS, and served to explain a substantial percentage of variance in levels of PTS. 
Furthermore, current results indicate that Preference and Acceptance beliefs directly 
impacted levels of PTS such that higher levels of each of these rational beliefs contributed to 
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lower levels of PTS. Additionally, Acceptance beliefs were found to moderate the impact of 
Catastrophizing beliefs on levels of PTS. These results provide additional and unique support 
for the cognitive protective role played by rational beliefs. 
 Findings from the current study are not limited to REBT theory, but can be viewed as 
having significance to the wider CBT community. As a consequence of REBT being the 
original cognitive6behavioural model, many of the important functional and dysfunctional 
cognitive processes first described within REBT theory have been adopted and incorporated 
into distinct CBT models. For example, Catastrophizing beliefs are an integral component of 
contemporary Cognitive Therapy models of PTSD, as well as panic disorder and generalized 
anxiety disorder (see Clark & Beck, 2010). Low Frustration Tolerance beliefs are 
synonymous with “distress intolerance” beliefs which are a key component of Dialectical 
Behavioural Therapy’s theory of borderline personality disorder (Linehan, 1993). More 
recently distress intolerance beliefs have been demonstrated to be important predictors of 
PTSD (Marshall6Berenz, Vujanovic, Bonn6Miller, Bernstein, & Zvolensky, 2010; Vujanovic, 
Bonn6Miller, Potter, Marshall6Berenz, & Zvolensky, 2011). Additionally, Acceptance beliefs 
share a certain degree of similarity to the concept of acceptance described in Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting, Twohig, & Wilson, 2004) and within 
other mindfulness6based disciplines (e.g., Mindfulness6Based Stress Reduction, and 
Mindfulness6Based Cognitive Therapy). Although REBT theory and these mindfulness6based 
models talk of acceptance there are important distinctions. The mindfulness6based 
approaches encourage full attending to, and non6judgemental acceptance of, all contents of 
consciousness however pleasant or unpleasant, desirable or undesirable, they may be. 
Contrastingly in REBT theory Acceptance beliefs involve an active process in which the 
contents of consciousness (thoughts, emotions, physical sensations), as well as the realities of 
the external world, are explicitly judged as being undesirable, unpleasant, painful, etc., but 
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are accepted because that is the nature of reality in that moment. Moreover, in REBT theory 
Acceptance is the process of evaluating internal and external occurrences without making 
illogical overgeneralisations (e.g., not judging a person totally, based upon one moment of 
poor behaviour). Current findings consequently can be viewed as not only providing 
empirical support for a number of important predictions of REBT theory, but as widely 
supportive of the more general CBT model of psychopathology.  
 As with any research endeavour there are a number of limitations associated with the 
current study that ought to be considered. The nature of the sample is limited to a very 
specific strata of the population (law enforcement, military, and emergency service 
personnel) experiencing symptoms of PTS, thus generalisations of current findings to the 
other contexts is not possible. Future research should seek to replicate this study within 
populations experience various other psychological maladies in order to generate more robust 
and reliable conclusions. The current study also employed a measure of general rational and 
irrational beliefs however it would have been preferable to examine the role of disorder 
specific rational and irrational beliefs, as disorder6specific beliefs would likely provide a far 
clearer indication of the true role played by these cognitions in PTS. Additionally, a self6
report measure of PTS was used and although self6report measures of PTS such as the PDS 
used in the current study have been shown to highly correspond with clinician6administered 
measures (Griffin et al., 2004), clinician based measures would have been preferable as they 
are considered the gold standard method of assessing PTSD symptomology. 
 In conclusion, this study substantially contributes to the scientific literature in a 
number of important ways. The current study is the first of its kind to investigate the role of 
rational or irrational beliefs in the context of symptoms of PTS. As such this study has 
established the important cognitive vulnerability role of irrational beliefs, and the important 
cognitive protective role of rational beliefs, in PTS. This provides important additional 
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evidence in support of REBT theory. Moreover, this study provides the first piece of 
empirical evidence that rational beliefs can serve to moderate the impact of irrational beliefs 
on psychological distress, although the protective role appears to be limited to Acceptance 
beliefs, specifically. Current results provide a new perspective on the protective role played 
by rational beliefs and thus opens up a new area of research for those in the REBT 
community to further explore in the context of a variety of other forms of psychopathology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Figure 1  
Relationship between Catastrophizing beliefs and PTS moderated by Acceptance beliefs 
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